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Abstract
We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-
objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and
Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming prob-
lems into linear programming problems. A cooperative game is attached and
we prove the non-emptiness of the core by using the duality theory from the
linear programming. In the multiobjective case, we give a characterization
of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game, which is balanced.
We also consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy
with a finite number of agents.
Keywords: fractional linear programming problem, cooperative game,
core, exchange economy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Owen considered the linear programming production problem with n pro-
ducers who have m resources and cooperate in order to produce p goods. The
producers’ aim is the maximization of their income, which is modeled as the
objective function of the discussed problem. A cooperative game is attached
and the fair allocation of the income is put into question. Methods from
duality theory are related to methods from cooperative games in order to
prove that the core is nonempty and to find its elements. The condition of
the nonemptiness of the core for a cooperative game is the balancedness, as
it was proved in [bon, shapley]
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The seminal work of Owen has many extensions. Samet and Zemel (1984)
studied the relation between the core of a given LP-game and the set of
payoff vectors generated by optimal dual solutions to the corresponding linear
program. Granot (1984) generalized the Owen’s model so that the resources
held by any subset of producers S is not restricted to be the vector sum of the
resources held by the members of S. He also proved the non-emptiness of the
core of the associated game. Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) considered linear
production games with committee control. Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse,
Engel and Tijs (2001) also studied linear production processes. Nishizaki
and Sakawa (1999, 2001) treated the multiobjective case.
In this paper, we consider that the producers want to maximize the av-
erage income on unit time, which is modeled by a fractional linear objective
function. We generalize the Owen’s model by introducing the fractional
linear programming production games for the single-objective and multi-
objective cases. The transformation of the fractional linear programming
problems into linear programming problems is made by using the method of
Chakraborty and Gupta (2002). We attach a cooperative game and we prove
the non-emptiness of its core. The multiobjective game is balanced, but not
superaditive. For this case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome
of the associate cooperative game. Finally, we consider the cooperative game
associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.
The paper is organized in the following way: fractional linear program-
ming production game is presented in Section 2, the multiobjective model is
studied in Section 3 and the fractional linear programming production game
with fuzzy parameters is the containt of Section 4.
2. Fractional linear programming production games
2.1. The model
A colection B of coalitions is said to be balanced if there exists γ(S) > 0
for each S ∈ B such that, for each i ∈ N,
∑
S∈B
i∈S
γ(S) = 1. The coop-
erative game (N, V ) is called balanced if for each balanced colection B,∑
S∈B γ(S)V (S) ≤ V (N).
We consider here the following model of fractional linear production game.
There are m types of resurces used for the production of p goods. For each
i ∈ N, the player i is endowed with a vector bi of resources, where bi =
(bi1, b
i
2, ..., b
i
m). Any coalition S will use a total of bk(S) =
∑
i∈S b
i
k units
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of the kth resource. We assume that a unit of the jth good (j = 1, ..., p)
requires akj units of the k th resource (k = 1, ..., m). A coalition S uses
all its resources in order to produce a vector (x1, x2, ..., xp) of goods which
satisfies
a11x1 + a12x2 + ...+ a1pxp ≤ b1(S)
a21x1 + a22x2 + ...+ a2pxp ≤ b2(S)
................................................ (1)
am1x1 + am2x2 + ... + ampxp ≤ bm(S)
x1, x2, ..., xp ≥ 0.
The players of the coalition S want to maximize the function N(x)
D(x)
=
c1x1+c2x2+...+cpxp+c0
d1x1+d2x2+...+dpxp+d0
, which means the average income on unit time as in Tigan
[].
We will denote by x = (x1, x2, ..., xp)
T , c = (c1, c2, ..., cp)
T , d = (d1, d2, ..., dp)
T ∈
Rp, A = (aij)i=1,m
j=1,p
∈ Rm×p, b(S) = (b1(S), b2(S), ..., bp(S))
T ∈ Rm, DS =
{x ∈ Rp : Ax ≤ b(S), x ≥ 0} ⊆ Rp.
After we make the substitution (Charnes and Cooper) y = tx, t = 1
dx+d0
,
the problem (1) becomes equivalent with (2), where
Max tN(y
t
)
tD(y
t
) ≤ 1 (2)
A(y
t
)− b(S) ≤ 0
t > 0, y ≥ 0.
Assume that x ∈ ∆ := {x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} implies D(x) > 0.
The problem (2) can be reduced to problem (3) :
P (S)
Max cy + c0t
dy + d0t ≤ 1
Ay − tb(S) ≤ 0 (3)
t > 0, y ≥ 0.
We present here several results conserning the relation between the above
problems.
Theorem 1. (Schaible [,]). Let for some ξ ∈ ∆, N(ξ) ≥ 0, if (1) reaches a
(global) maximum at x = x∗, then (3) reaches a (global) maximum at a point
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(t, y) = (t∗, y∗), where y
∗
t∗
= x∗ and the objective functions at these points are
equal.
Theorem 2. (Schaible []) If (1) reaches a (global) maximum at a point x∗,
then the corresponding transformed problem (3) attains the same maximum
value at a point (t∗, y∗) where x∗ = y
∗
t∗
. Moreover (3) has a concave objective
function and a convex feasible set.
2.2. The associated cooperative game
We associate to the problem above the cooperative game (N, V ), where
N is the set of players and V : P(N)→ R, where V is defined by
V (S) = c1y1 + c2y2 + ... + cpyp + c0t if S ( N, where y is an optimal
solution to problem P (S)
and
V (N) = γ(c1y1 + c2y2 + ... + cpyp + c0t), where y is an optimal solution
to problem P (N)
and γ > max(γ∗, n) and γ∗ = maxB
∑
S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced
coalition of N.
We prove first the nonemptiness of the core of the game (N, V ). This fact
is a consequence of fact that the game is balanced.
Theorem 3. The game (N, V ) is balanced.
Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that∑
S∈B γ(S)bk(S) = bk(N) for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}, and then,∑
S∈B γ(S)v(S) =
=
∑
S∈B γ(S)(c1y1(S) + c2y2(S) + ... + cpyp(S) + c0t(S)) =
=
∑p
j=1 cj(
∑
S∈B γ(S)yj(S)) + c0
∑
S∈B γ(S)t(S) =
= γ(
∑p
j=1 cj ŷj + c0t̂), where
γ
′
=
∑
S∈B V (S), ŷj :=
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
yj(S) and t̂ =
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S).
Assume that (y(S), t(S)) ∈ DS.
Since Ay(S) ≤ t(S)b(S) for each S ∈ B and γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0, it follows that
Aγ(S)
γ′
y(s) ≤ t(S)γ(S)
γ′
b(S). By adding, we obtain A(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤
(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
b(S))t(S), and then A(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤ b(N)(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S)).
Therefore, Aŷ ≤ b(N)t̂, that is (ŷ, t̂) verifies Ay − tb(N) ≤ 0
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Since dy(S) + d0t(S) ≤ 1 for each S ∈ B and
γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0, it follows that
d
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(S) + d0
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S) ≤ 1 and then, dŷ + d0t̂ ≤ 1.
We notice that ŷj, t̂ ≥ 0 and conclude that (ŷ, t̂) is a feasible solution for
the linear problem associated to the coalition N and V (N) ≥ γ′(c1ŷ1+c2ŷ2+
...+ cpŷp + c0t̂).
Corollary 4. The core of the game (N, V ) is nonempty.
Now, we find the elements of the core for the game (N, V ).
We denote c′ = (c, c0), y
′ = (y, t) ∈ Rp
+1
, b′(S) = (d0,−b(S)) ∈ R
m+1A′(S) =(
d d0
A −b(S)
)
∈ R(m+1)×(p+1).
We write the primal problem (3) as
P (S) : Maxc′y′
A′(S)y′ ≤ (1, 0, .., 0, 0)T
y′ ≥ 0.
The dual of P (S) is the problem D(S), where
D(S) : Minω1
(A′(S))Tω ≥ c′
ωi ≥ 0 for each i = 1, ..., m+ 1.
Explicitely, for each S ( N, D(S) is
D(S) : Minω1
dω1 + A
T (ω2, ω3, ..., ωm+1)
T ≥ c
d0ω1 − b(S)(ω2, ω3, ..., ωm+1)
T ≥ c0
ωi ≥ 0 for each i = 1, ..., m+ 1.
and D(N) is Minω1
dω1 + A
T (ω2, ω3, ..., ωm+1)
T ≥ γc
d0ω1 − b(S)(ω2, ω3, ..., ωm+1)
T ≥ γc0
ωi ≥ 0 for each i = 1, ..., m+ 1.
Let ω∗ = (ω∗1, ω
∗
2, ..., ω
∗
m+1)
T be a solution of D(N). Then, V (N) = ω∗1
and let u = (u1, u2, ..., un)
T such that ui =
1
n
ω∗1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
We will prove that (u1, u2, ..., un)
T ∈core(N, V ).
First,
∑
i∈N ui = v(N).
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We must show, in addition, that
∑
i∈S ui ≥ v(S) for each S ⊂ N.
Notice that
∑
i∈S ui =
|S|
n
ω∗1.
The vector (
ω∗1
γ
,
ω∗2
γ
, ...,
ω∗m+1
γ
) verifies the restrictions of D(S) :
d0
ω∗1
γ
= b(S)
γ
(ω∗2, ..., ω
∗
m+1)
T = d0
ω∗1
γ
− b(N)
γ
(ω∗2, ..., ω
∗
m+1)
T+ b(N)−b(S)
γ
(ω∗2, ..., ω
∗
m+1)
T ≥
c0
and
d
ω∗1
γ
= 1
γ
AT (ω∗2, ..., ω
∗
m+1)
T ≥ c.
It follows that V (S) ≤
ω∗1
γ
.
Since γ ≥ n, we have that 1
γ
≤ 1
n
≤ |S|
n
for each S ⊆ N and then,∑
i∈S ui =
|S|
n
ω∗1 ≥
1
γ
ω∗1 ≥ V (S) for each S ⊆ N.
We conclude that (u1, u2, ..., un)
T ∈core(N, V ).
3. Multiobjective fractional linear programming production games
3.1. The model
We prove that the game is balanced, but it is not superaditive. We give
a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game.
Let n be a fixed positive integer, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players
and P(N), the set of nonempty subsets ofN being the set of coalitions formed
with players 1, 2, ..., n.
For each coalition S ⊆ N, define the problem P (S) :
P (S) :
max z1(x) =
N1(x)
D1(x)
= c1x+c10
d1x+d10
z2(x) =
N2(x)
D2(x)
= c2x+c20
d2x+d20
...
zr(x) =
Nr(x)
Dr(x)
= crx+cr0
drx+dr0
a11x1 + a12x2 + ...+ a1pxp ≤ b1(S)
a21x1 + a22x2 + ...+ a2pxp ≤ b2(S)
................................................ (4)
am1x1 + am2x2 + ... + ampxp ≤ bm(S)
x1, x2, ..., xp ≥ 0,
where ci, di, x ∈ R
p for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., r), A = (aij)i=1,m
j=1,p
∈ Rm×p,
b(S) = (b1(S), b2(S), ..., bp(S))
T ∈ Rm, DS = {x ∈ R
p : Ax ≤ b(S), x ≥ 0} ⊆
Rp.
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Let F (x) = ( c1x+c10
d1x+d10
, ..., crx+cr0
drx+dr0
).
Let I = {i : Ni(x) ≥ 0 for some x ∈ D}
IC = {i : Ni(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ D}.
Suppose D is nonempty and bounded.
We present here a model developement due to Chakraborty and Gupta
(2002).
Let t = ∩i∈I
1
dix+di0
and t = ∩i∈IC
−1
cix+ci0
⇔ 1
dix+di0
≥ t for each i ∈ I and
−1
cix+ci0
≥ t for each i ∈ IC and y = tx.
The multiobjective linear fractional programming problem (4) is equiva-
lent with the multiobjective linear programming problem (5):
Max {tNi(
y
t
) if i ∈ I, tDi(
y
t
) i ∈ IC}
tDi(
y
t
) ≤ 1 if i ∈ I
tNi(
y
t
) ≤ 1 if i ∈ IC (5)
A(y
t
)− b(S) ≤ 0
t, y ≥ 0.
Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) proved that the constraint set of (5) is
non-empty convex set having feasible points.
We will assume further that IC = ∅.
We will use the following notations:
TS = {(t, y) : (t, y) verifies the restriction of the problem (2)};
T̂S = {(z ∈ R
r : z = F (t, y), (t, y) ∈ Ts}
V (S) = (MaxT̂S − R
r
+) ∩ R
r
+.
3.2. The associated cooperative game
We prove that the game is balanced, but it is not superaditive. We give
a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} and V : P (N)→ Rr be defined by
V (S) = (MaxT̂S − R
r
+) ∩ R
r
+ for each S ⊂ N
and
V (N) = (MaxγT̂N − R
r
+) ∩ R
r
+
where γ > max(γ∗, n) and γ∗ = maxB
∑
S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced
coalition of N.
The set of imputation of the game is
I(N, V ) = {x ∈ Rm×n+ : xN ∈MaxVN , xi /∈ V{i}\MaxV{i}, ∀i ∈ N}
The stable outcome is
SO(N, V ) = {x ∈ Rm×n+ : xS /∈ V (S)\MaxV (S), ∀S ⊂ N}.
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The problem (5) is equivalent with the problem (6)
Max ciy + ci0t, i = 1, ..., m;
diy + di0t ≤ 1 i = 1, ..., m;
A(y)− tIb(S) ≤ 0 (6)
t, y ≥ 0.
Theorem 5. The game (N, V ) is balanced.
Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that∑
S⊂N γ(S)bk(S) =
∑
S⊂N
∑
i∈S γ(S)b
i
k(S) =
∑
i∈N{
∑
S⊂N,Si γ(S)}b
i
k =∑
i∈N b
i
k = bk(N)
for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}.
Let z(y(S), t(S)) = (z1(y(S), t(S)), z2(y(S), t(S)), ..., zl(y(S), t(S))) ∈ V (S)
and then,∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
z(y(S), t(S)) =
=
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
(..., ciy(S) + y(S)ci0, ...) =
= (t̂N1(
ŷ
t̂
), t̂N2(
ŷ
t̂
), ..., t̂Nl(
ŷ
t̂
)) =
= z(ŷ, t̂),
where γ
′
=
∑
S∈B γ(S), ŷ :=
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(S) and t̂ =
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S),
ŷ ∈ Rp+, t̂ ∈ R+.
Assume that (y(S), t(S)) ∈ DS.
Since Ay(S) ≤ t(S)b(S) for each S ∈ B and γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0, it follows that
Aγ(S)
γ′
y(s) ≤ t(S)γ(S)
γ′
b(S). By adding, we obtain A(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤
(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
b(S))t(S), and then A(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤ b(N)(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S)).
Therefore, Aŷ ≤ b(N)t̂, that is (ŷ, t̂) verifies Ay − tb(N) ≤ 0
Since dy(S) + d0t(S) ≤ 1 for each S ∈ B and
γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0, it follows that
d
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(S) + d0
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S) ≤ 1 and then, dŷ + d0t̂ ≤ 1.
We notice that ŷ, t̂ ≥ 0 and conclude that (ŷ, t̂) ∈ V (N) and therefore∑
S⊂N γ(S)(y(S), t(S)) ∈ V (N)....
Since
∑
S⊂N γ(S)V (S) ⊂ V (N), it follows that is the game (N, V ) is
balanced.
We consider the dual problem to the multiobjective linear problem in
order to find a point beloging to the core. We present here some useful
results concerning the duality of the multiobjective linear programming.
Let the primal and the dual problems as follows:
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max z(x) = Cx
z ∈ Tp = {x : Ax = b, x ∈ R
p
+} (7)
and respectively
min g(w) = wb
w ∈ Td = {w : wAu ≤ Cu for no u ∈ R
p
+}, (8)
where z(x) = (z1(x), z2(x), ..., zr(x)}, g(w) = (g1(w), g2(w), ..., gr(w)),
C ∈ Rr+p, A ∈ Rm+p, b ∈ C ∈ Rm.
We will use the following theorems.
Theorem 6. If x is a feasible solution of primal problem (7) and w is a
feasible solution of dual problem (8), it is not the case that g(w) ≤ z(x).
Theorem 7. Assume that x∗ is a feasible solution of primal problem (7) and
w is a feasible solution of dual problem (8). Also assume that z(x∗) = g(w∗)
is satisfied. Then, x∗ is a Pareto optimal solution of primal problem (7), and
w∗ is a Pareto optimal solution of dual problem (8).
Theorem 8. Considering main problem (7) and dual problem (8), the fol-
lowing two statements are equivalent.
(1) Each of the problems has a feasible solution.
(2) Each of the problem has a Pareto optimal solution, and there
exists at least a pair of Pareto optimal solutions such that z(x∗) = g(w∗).
Theorem 9. The necessary and sufficient condition for x∗ to be a Pareto
optimal solution of primal problem (7) is that there exists a feasible solution
w∗ of dual problem (8) such that z(x∗) = g(w∗). Then, w∗ itself is a Pareto
optimal solution of dual problem (8).
The next theorem gives an element of the Stable outcome.
Theorem 10. Let ω∗ be a Pareto optimal solution of the dual problem of
the associated multiobjective linear programming problem (3) with S = N.
Then the payoff u = (u1·, u2·, ..., un·) ∈ R
r×n, ui· = (ui1, ui2, ..., uir) defined by
uik =
1
n
ω∗k1, i = 1, 2, ..., n and k = 1, 2, ..., r belongs to the stable outcome of
the game (N, V ).
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Proof. We will formulate first the multiobjective linear production pro-
gramming problems P (S) for each S ⊆ N equivalent to the multiobjective
fractional linear production programming problems and the dual.
Let c′ ∈ Rr×(p+1), A′ ∈ R(r+m)×(p+1) and b′ ∈ Rr+m be defined as c′ =
(c1, e1, ..., cr, cr0), A
′(S) =
(
(di)i∈I (di0)i∈I
A −Imb(S)
)
b′ = (1I , 0Rm), where 1I =
(1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ Rl and 0Rm = (0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ R
m.
For each S ( N, the problem P (S) is
P (S) : Max c′(y, t)
(y, t) ∈ Tp = {(y, t) : A
′(S)(y, t) = b′, (y, t) ∈ Rp+1+ }
and P (N) : Max γc′(y, t)
(y, t) ∈ Tp = {(y, t) : A
′(S)(y, t) = b′, (y, t) ∈ Rp+1+ }
Let T̂S , T̂N be the feasible areas in the objective space of primal problems
P (S), resp. P (N).
For each S ( N, the dual D(S) is
D(S) : Min ωb′
ω ∈ Td = {ω : ωA
′(S)u ≤ c′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ }
and D(N) is Min ωb′
ω ∈ Td = {ω : ωA
′(N)u ≤ γc′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ }
Let ω∗ and (y∗, t∗) be Pareto optimal solutions for the problems D(N)
and P (N).
It follows that ω∗b′ = c′(y∗, t∗) and then, ω∗b′ ∈MaxT̂N . We have that∑
i∈N ui,· =
∑
i∈N
1
n
ω1,· = (ω
∗
11, ..., ω
∗
1r) ∈MaxV (N).
For each S ( N,
∑
i∈S ui,· =
∑
i∈N
|S|
n
ω∗1,·
ω∗A′(N)u ≤ γc′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ implies that
ω∗
γ
A′(S)u ≤ c′u for no
u ∈ Rp+1+ . It follows that
ω∗b′
γ
∈ V (S). Since γ ≥ n, 1
γ
≤ 1
n
≤ |S|
n
for each
S ⊆ N.∑
i∈S ui,· =
∑
i∈N
|S|
n
ω∗1,· ≥
1
γ
ω∗1.
Then
∑
i∈S ui,· /∈ V (S)−MaxV (S)
We conclude that u = (u1·, u2·, ..., un·) ∈ SO(N, V ).
4. Exchange economies
We consider a pure exchange economy E = (Xi, ei, Ui)i∈N with a fi-
nite number of agents, N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The commodity space is the Eu-
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clidean space Rm. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by her consump-
tion set Xi = R
m, her initial endowment ei ∈ R
m
+ and her utility function
Ui :
∏
i∈N Xi → R. An allocation is an element xi ∈ R
m
+ . An allocation x is
a feasible allocation if
∑
i∈N xi ≤
∑
i∈N ei.
Let p = mn.We will use the following notation: instead of x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) =
(x11, x
2
1, ..., x
m
1 , x
1
2, x
2
2, ..., x
m
2 , ..., x
1
n, x
2
n, ..., x
m
n ) ∈ R
p
+, we will use x = (x1, x2, ..., xm,
x1+m, ..., x2m, ..., x(n−1)m+1, ..., xnm), where (x
1
i , x
2
i , ..., x
m
i ) = (x(i−1)m+1, ..., xim).
For each S ⊆ N, we define the problem P (S) :
max U1(x) =
N1(x)
D1(x)
= c11x1+c12x2+...+cmxm+c10
d11x1+d12x2+...+d1mxm+d10
U2(x) =
N2(x)
D2(x)
=
c21xl+1+c22xl+2+...+c2mx2m+c20
d21xl+1+d22xl+2+...+d2mxm+2+d20
...
Un(x) =
Nn(x)
Dn(x)
=
cn1x(m−1)n+1+cn2x(m−1)n+2+...+cnmxmn+cn0
dn1x(m−1)n+1+dn2x(m−1)n+2+...+dnmxmn+dn0
a11(S)x1 + a12(S)x2 + ... + a1p(S)xp ≤ b1(S)
a21(S)x1 + a22(S)x2 + ... + a2p(S)xp ≤ b2(S)
................................................ (9)
am1(S)x1 + am2(S)x2 + ...+ amp(S)xp ≤ bm(S)
a11(N)x1 + a12(N)x2 + ...+ a1p(N)xp ≤ b1(N)
a21(N)x1 + a22(N)x2 + ...+ a2p(N)xp ≤ b2(N)
................................................
am1(N)x1 + am2(N)x2 + ...+ amp(N)xp ≤ bm(N)
x1, x2, ..., xp ≥ 0,
where ci = (ci1, ci2, ..., cim)
T , di = (di1, di2, ..., dim)
T ∈ Rm for each i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n), x ∈ Rp, A = (aij)i=1,m
j=1,p
∈ Rm×p, b(S) = (b1(S), b2(S), ..., bm(S))
T ∈
Rm, DS = {x ∈ R
p
+ : A(S)x ≤ b(S), A(N)x ≤ b(N), x ≥ 0} ⊆ R
p
+.
The coefficients aij(S) are defined as follows.
For S ⊂ N, aij(S) =


1 if j = (k − 1)m+ i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m− 1} and k ∈ S;
0 if j ∈ (k − 1)m+ i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m− 1} and k /∈ S;
1 if j = km and k ∈ S;
0 if j = km and k /∈ S.
for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m} and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}.
For S ⊆ N, the coefficients bi(S) =
∑
j∈S e
i
j represents the initial endow-
ment from the ith good of the coalition S.
The multiobjective linear fractional programming problem (9) is equiva-
lent with the multiobjective linear programming problem (10):
Max {tNi(
y
t
), i ∈ N}
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tDi(
y
t
) ≤ 1 if i ∈ N................(10)
A(S)(y
t
)− b(S) ≤ 0
A(N)(y
t
)− b(N) ≤ 0
t ∈ R+, y ∈ R
m
+ , or, explicitely,
Max ciy + ci0t, i = 1, ..., m;
diy + di0t ≤ 1, i = 1, ..., m;
A(S)y − tIb(S) ≤ 0....................(11)
A(N)y − tIb(N) ≤ 0
t ∈ R+, y ∈ R
m
+ .
We will attach the following cooperative game (N, V ) to the economy E ,
V : P(N)→ Rn, V (∅) = {0}, V (S) = (MaxT̂S − R
n
+) ∩ R
n
+ for each S ⊂ N,
V (N) = (MaxγT̂N − R
n
+) ∩ R
n
+
where γ > max(γ∗, n) and γ∗ = maxB
∑
S∈B γ(S), B being any balanced
coalition of N, TS = {(t, y) : (t, y) verifies the restrictions of the problem
(3)}; T̂S = {z ∈ R
m : z = (tNi(
y
t
))i∈{1,2,...,m}, (t, y) ∈ Ts}.
We obtain the following results.
Theorem 11. The game (N, V ) is balanced.
Proof. Let B be a balanced colection of N. First, we have that∑
S⊂N γ(S)bk(S) =
∑
S⊂N
∑
i∈S γ(S)b
i
k(S) =
∑
i∈N{
∑
S⊂N,Si γ(S)}b
i
k =∑
i∈N b
i
k = bk(N)
for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}.
Let z(y(S), t(S)) = (z1(y(S), t(S)), z2(y(S), t(S)), ..., zl(y(S), t(S))) ∈ V (S)
and then,∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
z(y(S), t(S)) =
=
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
(..., ciy(S) + y(S)ci0, ...) =
= (t̂N1(
ŷ
t̂
), t̂N2(
ŷ
t̂
), ..., t̂Nl(
ŷ
t̂
)) =
= z(ŷ, t̂),
where γ
′
=
∑
S∈B γ(S), ŷ :=
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(S) and t̂ =
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S),
ŷ ∈ Rp+, t̂ ∈ R+.
Assume that (y(S), t(S)) ∈ DS.
We have that A(S)y(S) ≤ t(S)b(S) and A(N)y(S) ≤ t(S)b(N) for each
S ∈ B, γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0. Consequently, γ(S)
γ′
A(N)y(s) ≤ t(S)γ(S)
γ′
b(N). By adding, we
obtain
∑
S∈BA(N)
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
A(N)y(s) ≤
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S)b(N) ≤
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b(N)
∑
S∈B t(S)
γ(S)
γ′
, and then A(N)(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(s)) ≤ b(N)(
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S)).
Therefore, A(N)ŷ ≤ b(N)t̂, that is (ŷ, t̂) verifies A(N)y − tb(N) ≤ 0
Since dy(S) + d0t(S) ≤ 1 for each S ∈ B and
γ(S)
γ′
≥ 0, it follows that
d
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
y(S) + d0
∑
S∈B
γ(S)
γ′
t(S) ≤ 1 and then, dŷ + d0t̂ ≤ 1.
We notice that ŷ, t̂ ≥ 0 and conclude that (ŷ, t̂) ∈ V (N) and therefore∑
S⊂N γ(S)(y(S), t(S)) ∈ V (N),.....
...
∑
S⊂N γ(S)V (S) ⊂ V (N), that is the game is balanced.
We consider the dual problem to the multiobjective linear problem in
order to find a point beloging to the stable outcome SO(N, V ) = {x ∈
Rm×n+ : xS /∈ V (S)\MaxV (S), ∀S ⊂ N}.
The next theorem gives an element of the Stable outcome.
Theorem 12. Let ω∗ be a Pareto optimal solution of the dual problem of
the associated multiobjective linear programming problem (3) with S = N.
Then the payoff u = (u1·, u2·, ..., un·) ∈ R
n×n, ui· = (ui1, ui2, ..., uin) defined
by uik =
1
n
ω∗k1, i = 1, 2, ..., n and k = 1, 2, ..., n belongs to the stable outcome
of the game (N, V ).
Proof. We will formulate first the multiobjective linear production pro-
gramming problems P (S) for each S ⊆ N equivalent to the multiobjective
fractional linear production programming problems and the dual.
Let p = nm, c′ ∈ Rn×(p+1), A′ ∈ R(n+2m)×(p+1) and b′ ∈ Rn+2m be defined
as c′ = (c1, c10, ..., cr, cr0), A
′(S) =

(di)i∈I (di0)i∈IA(S) −Imb(S)
A(N) −Imb(N)

 b′ = (1I , 0Rm, 0Rm),
where 1I = (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ R
m and 0Rm = (0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ R
m.
For each S ( N, the problem P (S) is
P (S) : Max c′(y, t)
(y, t) ∈ Tp = {(y, t) : A
′(S)(y, t) = b′, (y, t) ∈ Rp+1+ }
and P (N) : Max γc′(y, t)
(y, t) ∈ Tp = {(y, t) : A
′(S)(y, t) = b′, (y, t) ∈ Rp+1+ }
Let T̂S , T̂N be the feasible areas in the objective space of primal problems
P (S), resp. P (N).
For each S ( N, the dual D(S) is
D(S) : Min ωb′
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ω ∈ Td = {ω : ωA
′u ≤ c′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ }
and D(N) is Min ωb′
ω ∈ Td = {ω : ωA
′u ≤ γc′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ }
Let ω∗ and (y∗, t∗) be Pareto optimal solutions for the problems D(N)
and P (N).
It follows that ω∗b′ = c′(y∗, t∗) and then, ω∗b′ ∈MaxT̂N . We have that∑
i∈N ui,· =
∑
i∈N
1
n
ω1,· = (ω
∗
11, ..., ω
∗
1n) ∈MaxV (N).
For each S ( N,
∑
i∈S ui,· =
∑
i∈N
|S|
n
ω∗1,·
ω∗A′(N)u ≤ γc′u for no u ∈ Rp+1+ implies that
ω∗
γ
A′(S)u ≤ c′u for no
u ∈ Rp+1+ . It follows that
ω∗b′
γ
∈ V (S). Since γ ≥ n, 1
γ
≤ 1
n
≤ |S|
n
for each
S ⊆ N.∑
i∈S ui,· =
∑
i∈N
|S|
n
ω∗1,· ≥
1
γ
ω∗1.
Then
∑
i∈S ui,· /∈ V (S)−MaxV (S)
We conclude that u = (u1·, u2·, ..., un·) ∈ SO(N, V ).
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